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The 2011 England Riots in European context: A framework for understanding the 
‘life-cycle’ of riots 
 
Tim Newburn 
 
 
This paper examines the 2011 England riots and seeks to place them in their 
recent comparative context. Briefly, it sets out a ‘life-cycle’ model for 
(historical and comparative) analysis, and then uses this as the basis for 
contrasting the English experience with the rioting witnessed in other 
European countries in recent times – in particular the riots in France in 2005 
and in Sweden in 2013. Using a range of sources, the analysis identifies a 
number of similarities and differences between the aetiology, nature and 
aftermath of the riots in the different countries, and argues that this 
illustrates both the potential of comparative analysis and the importance of 
moving beyond an examination of their aetiology, to study riots ‘in the 
round’.  
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Understanding and analysing riots 
In what follows my aim is to place the 2011 English riots in an historical and, most 
importantly, a comparative context. To do so I set out an analytical model that can 
be used for comparative study but which, equally, can also form the basis for any 
broad analysis of riots. The paper then examines, briefly, the 2011 England riots, 
before moving on to a comparison with the French rioting of 2005 and the riots in 
Sweden in 2013. In doing so it is not my intention to make particular claims on behalf 
of this particular comparison rather, following similar arguments about comparative 
analysis of policy-making (Tonry, 2015), I want to make the case for the importance 
of comparative analysis in this field and, in parallel, in doing so seek to illustrate 
elements of the utility of the model that I propose.  
 
The model outlined here, which extends earlier work (Newburn, 2015a), was initially 
stimulated by, and in turn seeks to extend, the influential ‘flashpoints’ model 
developed by David Waddington and colleagues (see for example Waddington et al, 
1989; King and Waddington, 2006). My model, however, departs in a number ways 
from extant approaches to the analysis of riots. First and foremost, where the bulk of 
previous scholarship has tended to focus on the antecedents or aetiology of riots, 
this model focuses on what might be thought of as their ‘life-cycle’. That is to say, 
whilst like extant work it seeks to understand how riots come to happen – what are 
the major contextual and contingent factors that might help us explain them – it also 
seeks to move beyond such concerns to focus both on how riots unfold and what 
follows in their wake. The model recognises that not only do riots differ in what 
might crudely be thought of as their ‘causes’, but also in the ways they unfold and 
spread, in the types and numbers of people involved, their motivations and 
rationalisations, the ways in which riots are policed, managed and otherwise 
responded to, and in terms of their aftermath. Now it is not my contention that such 
features are entirely absent from earlier work, far from it. Rather, it is that the 
tendency has been to place less emphasis on such matters in formal analytical 
models, to focus more on the lead-up to disorder, and less on its unfolding 
characteristics – how it changes over time and by location, and more specifically to 
tend to ignore or underplay what occurs in the aftermath.     
 
The second major extension proposed in this ‘life-cycle’ model is therefore a 
consequence of including the aftermath of riots in the analysis. Where most extant 
work on riots, including work based on the flashpoints model, has focused primarily 
on their aetiology, and then secondarily on their unfolding characteristics, a fully-
realized understanding of riots, in my view, also requires that we consider their 
aftermath and, in particular, that attention be focused on the response of the state 
to significant civil disorder. As Gadd (2015: 1031) observes in a different but cognate 
context: ‘Perhaps what matters more than the question of ‘why they did it’, 
however, is how violence was responded to in its aftermath, since this can 
determine how it is defined and whether it continues, retribution follows, as well as 
whether some form of justice is attained.’ This therefore forms an important part of 
the analytical model, requiring us to think not only about those economic, social, 
political and institutional features of the landscape that conduce toward rioting but, 
equally, to think about how agents, agencies and institutions operate once the 
violence has ceased and what the implications of such social reaction might be.  
 
In Table 1 below I set out four major sets of features that I argue can be used to 
frame the analysis of riots, including both historical and comparative analysis. The 
first set of features is what one might think of as the ‘context’ within which disorder 
occurs. This incorporates, and is similar in many respects to, the first three of 
Waddington’s flashpoints model’s levels: the structural, the political/ideological, and 
the cultural. Similarly, it would also incorporate, though it also extends considerably 
beyond, what Body-Gendrot and Savitch (2012) refer to as ‘mobilization potential’ –
the relationships and attitudes that facilitate or inhibit collective violence. The 
second set of features relate to the dynamic features of disorder and, more 
particularly, focus on the way in which disorder appears to start, subsequently 
matures or spreads, both geographically and temporally, and how long it lasts. It also 
incorporates some understanding of the factors that appear to bring the disorder to 
an end. Third, ‘nature’, focuses on issues of participation and motivation - who and 
how many people are involved in the rioting and the reasons and rationales for their 
participation – the ways in which the disorder is policed and, finally, what forms the 
disorder takes, such as attacks on police, on property, looting and so on.  
 
Finally, and as suggested earlier, in perhaps the most significant departure from 
other models that analyse rioting, the fourth set of features focuses largely on the 
aftermath. My argument here is that any full understanding of riots must necessarily 
incorporate some analysis of what happens once the violence has ceased (though 
accepting that many of these features whilst extending beyond the rioting, may 
begin in the midst of the violence). Here again I identity three broad sets of 
responses. The first is the political, the public and the media responses. How are 
riots framed? How are they talked about, defined, defended and attacked by 
politicians, pundits and public? Such matters deeply affect popular understandings 
of riots and are matters that vary considerably by time and place or, if one prefers, 
historically and comparatively. In this regard, however, it is important to recognise 
that reactions to rioting – what politicians, journalists and others have to say – often 
continue long beyond the period of rioting itself, and work to establish 
understandings of the events.  
 
Second is the response of the penal state, by which I mean both penal elites  - the 
essence of Garland’s (2013) narrower use of the term ‘penal state’ – as well as the 
penal system itself. How are the courts and systems of punishment mobilised? Who 
and how many people become caught up in the penal system, and with what 
consequence? Such matters have much to tell us both about the rioting itself – and 
how it is understood socially and politically – but, arguably, potentially also have 
something interesting to say about the wider social context in which rioting, and the 
reaction to rioting, occurs. The final element under ‘response’ is the public policy 
reaction to rioting: from decisions to appoint official inquiries (or not) through to 
economic, political and cultural policy responses relating to the communities 
affected, or to social, religious or ethnic groups involved. Again, such responses 
arguably contain lessons both for our understanding of the society within which such 
disorder occurs as well as forming an important element any fully-fledged 
understanding of the ‘life-cycle’ of riots.  
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
The English riots in their recent comparative context 
I now want to turn my attention to the comparison of the 2011 England riots with 
those in France in 2005 and Sweden in 2013. I selected these straightforwardly as 
two of the most significant examples of rioting in Europe in the past decade. Their 
selection is not intended to suggest they be seen as exemplary in any respect, and I 
accept both that other examples might have served just as well and, indeed, might 
have led to different conclusions. The point here is simply to illustrate the possibility 
and utility of comparative analysis in this regard (Tonry, 2015).  
 
Although the Home Secretary cautioned against drawing too direct a link, all major 
sources are agreed that the initial ‘trigger’ for the riots was the fatal shooting of a 
young mixed-race man, Mark Duggan, in north London on Thursday 4th August 2011 
(see for example: HAC, 2011; Metropolitan Police Service, 2012; Riots, Communities 
and Victims Panel, 2012). Two days later, family, friends and others marched on the 
local police station in Tottenham to protest about the shooting and the claims that 
were made about Duggan in the aftermath. These claims included that Duggan had 
been armed and had fired at police officers (in fact the firearm was found 
approximately four and a half metres from Duggan’s body and had not been fired), 
and that a police officer had been hit by a bullet fired by Duggan (in fact the bullet 
which lodged in an officer’s radio came from a police firearm). That the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) appeared to be the source of some of these 
claims further stoked the fires (IPCC, 2012).  
 
Tempers were further inflamed both by the very poor communication between the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London and Mark Duggan’s family, and by the 
subsequent mishandling of the Saturday evening protest. In particular, the perceived 
failure of the MPS to put forward an officer of sufficient seniority to signal that they 
were taking the protest seriously upset many outside the police station, and what 
appeared to some present to be the rough handling of one young female protestor 
by the police also contributed to the deteriorating mood. By early evening two police 
vehicles had been set on fire and, with the police service seemingly reticent to 
intervene, the disorder spiralled, with serious outbreaks occurring in Tottenham and 
nearby Wood Green, resulting in over 400 criminal offences being recorded, over 
200 arrests and the eventual deployment of 3,500 police officers (MPS, 2012).  
 
Over the next three days the rioting spread, initially across London, and 
subsequently to other cities including Birmingham, Manchester, Salford and 
Liverpool among others. In all, five people lost their lives during the riots, an 
estimated 15,000 people were involved in the disorder, over 4,000 arrests were 
made, and approximately 1,300 people received custodial sentences averaging 17 
months each (Ministry of Justice, 2012). British insurers expected to pay out 
something in the region of £200 million as a consequence (ABI, 2013). The English 
riots of 2011 could consequently lay claim to being the biggest civil disorder in a 
generation (Newburn, 2015a). 
 The 2005 riots in France began in the Parisian neighbourhood of Clichy-sous-Bois 
where a group of teenagers, who were returning home from playing football and 
had no identification papers on them, ran from a police patrol when they were asked 
to stop. Three of the boys climbed a fence and took refuge in an electricity sub-
station. Like many Parisian teenagers of African origin, they were afraid of the police 
and were particularly concerned about the consequences of being taken into 
custody. Their choice of hiding place was predictably disastrous, and when one 
touched the transformer all three were electrocuted. Only one survived. The two 
deaths occurred at a time when tensions between the police and the residents of 
Clichy-sous-Bois, and other Parisian banlieues, were already very high. The eventual 
outcome was some of the most severe rioting in living memory – described in 
American media as ‘civil war in France’ (Jobard, 2008) - affecting not just Paris but 
over 200 towns elsewhere. In excess of 10,000 cars were burned, hundreds of 
buildings severely damaged, over €200m worth of damage caused, more than 3,000 
people arrested, and a state of emergency declared by President Chirac.  
 
The spark for the rioting in Stockholm occurred on the evening of Sunday 19 May 
2013. Police had been called to the suburb of Husby, about 20 minutes from the city 
centre, where it was reported that a local man was brandishing a machete and was 
threatening people. In the course of the police operation that followed the 69-year 
old man was shot dead by the police. As so often occurs on such occasions a variety 
of stories then started to circulate about what had happened. The initial police 
report after the shooting claimed that the man had been holding a hostage inside his 
apartment. In fact it was his wife and there was no evidence that she was either 
being threatened or being held hostage. Equally, the ‘machete’ subsequently turned 
out to be a common-or-garden knife. Protests both over the nature of the police 
operation and the misinformation that was spread in the aftermath led to protests 
during the course of the following week. Initially organised by a community activist 
group, Megafonen, a peaceful demonstration outside a police station was planned 
for the Wednesday. As a spokesperson for Megafonen explained, they had two 
specific demands. “First of all we wanted an apology for the family of the man who 
was killed and an apology to the community of Husby for the militarisation of the 
area which was totally unnecessary. Secondly, we don't believe that the police and 
authorities should investigate itself.”1 
 
Rioting broke out the following weekend, with groups of youths in Husby setting fire 
to cars and attacking the police. On the first evening, though estimates varied 
widely, journalistic accounts suggested that upwards of 100 youths were involved 
                                                        
1
 Unless otherwise stated all quotes relating to Stockholm are taken from research interviews. I am 
grateful to Sorcha Pollak for undertaking this work.  
(see, for example, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/25/sweden-
europe-news). There was a similar though slightly larger outbreak of disorder in 
Husby the following day with rioting also spreading to other parts of Stockholm. On 
the Tuesday evening the rioting spread further in Stockholm with the bulk of the 
violence still being directed toward the police and toward vehicles, although one 
shopping centre was attacked. Although by the Thursday Stockholm was relatively 
calm, disorder had begun to occur in other cities including Örebro. At the end of five 
days of riots it was estimated that approximately 200 vehicles had been set on fire 
(Hörnqvist, this volume), with the total damage being over 60m Swedish kronor 
(over €10m). 
 
Even from these very brief descriptions it is clear that there are some similarities and 
obvious differences between what unfolded in France, England and Sweden. In 
terms of an immediate spark or flashpoint, all three were preceded by the deaths of 
citizens as a consequence of police activity. In both London and Stockholm this 
involved what was perceived to be excessive or illegitimate use of force by the 
police. In Paris, the deaths of the two young boys were viewed as the consequence 
of police actions, even if in this instance it was at one remove. This pattern is very 
much typical of rioting, with literature from across the world offering examples of 
police action being a typical trigger for collective violence (King and Waddington, 
2006; Body-Gendrot, 2013; Fassin, 2013). In all three cases, the period in between 
the deaths and the outbreak of disorder involved what initially were peaceful 
demonstrations, protestors focusing not only police use of force but also what they 
perceived to be the spread of false information by the authorities.  In terms of 
obvious contrast it is clear that the three sets of riots occurred on very different 
scales. The rioting in France affected hundreds of locations over a period of several 
weeks. The English riots, though on a very significant scale, did not spread nearly as 
far as those in France, and both the English and Swedish riots were over far quicker 
than those in France. The rioting in Sweden was on a much smaller scale than both 
other examples and barely spread beyond the capital city of Stockholm. A more 
systematic analysis of the three cases can be undertaken by applying the model 
outlined earlier. Given the level of detail potentially captured by the model it is only 
possible in the limited space here to focus on the key similarities and differences 
under the four general features of the model: context, dynamics, nature and 
response. 
 
 
Context 
That riots generally occur within, and draw people from, some of the poorest urban 
communities, is well established. To a significant extent the disorder in France, 
England and Sweden was no exception. The rioting in France in 2005 broke out 
initially in Clichy-sous-Bois, which is the poorest locality in Seine-Saint-Denis, the 
department with the highest unemployment rate in France (Body-Gendrot and 
Savitch, 2012). The rioting spread to approximately 300 locations, at least 85% of 
which were identified as one of Zones Urbaines Sensible (Jobard, 2008), 
characterised by extremely high levels of youth unemployment and a variety of 
other social problems (Salanié, 2006). In England, of the rioters interviewed in the 
Guardian/LSE Reading the Riots study who were of working age and not in 
education, three fifths were unemployed, a pattern confirmed by government data 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012). Young people appearing before the courts were 
significantly more likely to come from areas of high deprivation – with almost two-
thirds coming from one of the 20% most deprived areas in the country (Singleton, 
2011). Finally, the Stockholm suburb of Husby is also relatively disadvantaged, with 
disproportionate numbers of the young and unemployed – though as Barker (2013) 
notes, it ‘is a long way away from the burned out hyperghettos of absolute 
deprivation’. Husby is also perceived to be separate or marginalized, cut off from 
‘the wealthier “visibly Swedish” parts of the city’ (Kustermans, 2014: 3) and research 
by Malmberg et al (2013) found social and spatial marginalization from the state in 
Sweden to be a statistically significant factor in the urban geography of the rioting.   
 
As Kustermans notes, Husby is not only a relatively poor neighbourhood, it is also 
one with a very high proportion of minority ethnic residents. Of its approximately 
12,000 inhabitants, he suggests over 10,000 are of foreign origin, the vast majority of 
whom originate from another Nordic country or an EU Member State. To this extent, 
there are considerable similarities between Husby, Clichy and many of the other 
neighbourhoods in which the French rioting occurred – the French ‘banlieues’ also 
being home to disproportionate numbers of first and second generation immigrants. 
The ‘social segregation’ noted in Stockholm (Barker, 2013) appears also to apply to 
the banlieues (Lagrange, 2009). This, however, would be one point that offers some 
slight contrast with the riots in England where the spatial segregation is arguably not 
so strong – though this is relative.  This is not to argue that the rioters in England 
didn’t share the ‘frustration’ of the social marginalization felt by those involved in 
the French and Swedish riots, merely that in most cities in which there was 
significant rioting – Salford may be the exception here (Clifton and Allison, 2011) – 
rioters were both drawn from a range of neighbourhoods and often travelled some 
distance before becoming involved in the disorder. In Ealing, in west London for 
example, 60% of those charged with offences committed in the rioting in the area 
were not residents of the borough, and eyewitness accounts suggested that, once 
underway, a very diverse group of young people was involved in the disorder 
(Stenson, 2012).  
 
 
Dynamics 
What is impossible to ignore in the aetiology of rioting and, as outlined above, in 
these three sets of riots more particularly, is the role of the police. This is visible in at 
least three ways: the involvement of the police at the heart of the initial ‘spark’ or 
‘flashpoint’; the way in which initial protests following these flashpoints were 
handled by the police; and, more broadly, in the tactics utilised by the police as the 
disorder started to develop. The rioting in Clichy followed on the heels of the deaths 
of the two boys in the power substation having run from the attentions of the police. 
The riots in London and Stockholm both came after the deaths of the citizens at the 
hands of the police. In all three cases police actions were widely perceived in the 
communities concerned to lack legitimacy, and as confirmation that the police were 
not to be trusted. Furthermore, the police reaction to the protests that arose in 
Clichy, Tottenham and Husby in the aftermaths of the deaths was insufficient to 
mitigate the anger that was felt and was a significant precursor to the outbreak of 
trouble. Furthermore, in London, Paris and Stockholm there is evidence that the way 
in which the police managed the initial disorder was a significant factor in the 
subsequent diffusion of the rioting (Roche and de Maillard, 2009; Kustermans, 2014). 
 
Where the experiences most obviously depart in the three countries is in relation to 
the extent and diffusion of the riots. Where the rioting in England and Sweden lasted 
for four to five days, in France there was disorder for a full three weeks – though it is 
true to say that this was never longer than four to five days in any one location 
(Schneider, 2014). The riots in Stockholm were by far the least serious of the three 
countries, and also spread the least. Although the initial disorder in Husby did 
migrate to other suburbs of the capital, and very slightly beyond, this was its full 
extent. In England, the initial night of trouble in Tottenham and Wood Green in 
north London was followed by rioting across the capital, in a number of other major 
cities, and in approximately 60 locations altogether. Even this, however, could not 
compare with the diffusion of the rioting in France, where on at least 300 locations 
experienced disorder (Body-Gendrot, 2013). In both cases there is some evidence 
that encrypted messaging – one of the new tools of modern protest movements 
(Mason, 2012) – was heavily utilised in both England using BlackBerry Messenger 
(Ball and Brown, 2011) and France using SMS systems (Body-Gendrot, 2013; Sassen, 
2010). Such tools, however, were not in evidence in Husby.  
 
 
Nature 
Reading the Riots highlighted the centrality of rioters’ anger with the police as 
perhaps its most consistent finding across the cities in England in which rioting took 
place (Lewis et al, 2011). In addition to being a reaction to the shooting that 
precipitated the riots, and to generally poor police-community relations in the 
neighbourhoods in which the riots occurred, much of the anger was stimulated by 
the poor everyday treatment the young people involved they received from the 
police. Much of their anger coalesced around police stop and search tactics, and the 
perceived racial profiling underpinning the use of such powers. Precisely such a 
combination of factors is reported as having been central to the riots in both France 
and Sweden. In France, Fassin’s (2013) ethnographic research illustrates in some 
detail the discriminatory practices, including selective use of stop and search, 
operated by the anticrime squads in the Parisian banlieues. Similarly, (Barker, 2013) 
noted that the ‘police were the main targets’ of the riots in Sweden, and in 
understanding this it appears that police 'stop-and-search' practices were 
particularly relevant, though whether this was long-established police practices 
primarily related to drugs possession, or a more recently introduced policy by the 
Swedish Minister of Justice prior to the riots and which focused on irregular 
immigrants (Adman, 2013; Kustermans, 2014) remains somewhat unclear. 
 
Although there were some strong commonalities it is perhaps in relation to the 
‘nature’ of the disorder that some of the more significant differences can be 
observed in the three cases. I will focus on two contrasts: those relating to the 
identity of the rioters themselves, and the nature of the violence involved in the 
rioting. Earlier the parallels between aspects of the French banlieues and Husby and 
similar parts of Stockholm were noted – not least the disproportionate concentration 
of second-generation immigrants and the social segregation of such 
neighbourhoods. Although data on ethnicity are not collected in France, it is firmly 
believed that the rioters came mainly from minority backgrounds (Roché, 2006) and 
the same appears to have been true of Husby and the disorder in other parts of 
Stockholm (Barker, 2013). By contrast, the riots in England were, in some respects, 
quite multi-racial. Of those appearing before the courts, for example, 41% self-
identified as White, 39% Black, 12% of Mixed ethnicity; six per cent Asian and two 
per cent Chinese or other (Ministry of Justice, 2012). This varied significantly by area, 
again tending to reflect the nature of the neighbourhoods in which the riots 
occurred.  
 
The second set of contrasts can be found in the way in which the anger and 
frustrations felt by rioters are played out on the streets or, more particularly, which 
forms of violence predominated and on which targets such violence was focused. In 
all three cases, and perhaps predictably, the police were very much the focus on 
much of the rioters’ anger. In both France and Sweden a typically broad range of 
crimes was committed – one study of 208 arrestees in the 93rd department in France 
found 40% of offences to be crimes against police officers and 30% destruction or 
damage to public or private goods – but, unlike England, the most visible target of 
rioters’ violence was motor vehicles. In all, in France over 10,000 cars were 
destroyed, the bulk by arson (Jobard, 2008). Similarly, Hörnqvist (2014) notes that 
setting fire to cars in order to attract the police has been a Swedish specialty in 
certain circles for more than a decade. The riots in 2013 were no exception. By 
contrast, while attacks on vehicles, including police vehicles, was far from 
exceptional during the English riots, equally such activity was certainly not the most 
visible characteristic of the disorder. Certainly so far as media attention was 
concerned, that honour goes to the looting which was such a significant element of 
the 2011 riots. To reiterate what was argued earlier, whilst it is important not to 
exaggerate the extent to which the England riots were dominated by looting 
(Newburn et al, 2015), it is clear that such activity was far more extensive in England 
than was the case in either France or Sweden. Indeed, according to Roché (2010: 
157) in France ‘there was little looting as a rule, even when warehouses, chemists 
and banks were the objects of the attack’, and the same was broadly true of Sweden 
(Hörnqvist, 2014).  
 
 
Response 
Riots in contemporary times have classically provoked strong denunciation from 
political leaders, the aim appearing often to be to deflect attention away from any 
focus on the possibility that economic, social and cultural factors may have played 
some role in the development of such disorder. This defence of current 
arrangements is achieved by turning attention onto the behaviour and 
characteristics of the rioters themselves, potentially demonizing an already 
marginalized segment of the population. There were very clear illustrations of this 
tactic in all three cases under consideration here. In the aftermath of the England 
riots the Prime Minister described the actions of those out on the streets as 
‘criminality, pure and simple’2 and argued that the riots were not about race, or cuts, 
or poverty, but were simply about ‘behaviour’. It was, he said, ‘People showing 
indifference to right and wrong. People with a twisted moral code. People with a 
complete absence of self-restraint’. What we were witnessing, he went on, was 
‘Irresponsibility. Selfishness. Behaving as if your choices have no consequences. 
Children without fathers. Schools without discipline. Reward without effort’.3  
 
In a speech given in the midst of the Swedish riots, the Prime Minister, Fredrik 
Reinfeldt, blamed the riots on ‘angry young men’ who needed to overcome ‘cultural 
barriers’ and come to terms with the rules in a democratic society for expressing 
dissatisfaction and making claims’ (Schierup et al, 2014: 6). In context, and compared 
                                                        
2 Speech by David Cameron, 11 August 2011. Full text available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8695272/UK-riots-text-of-David-Camerons-
address-to- Commons.html (accessed 18.5.14) 
3 Speech by David Cameron, 15 August 2011. Full text available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2011/08/society-fight-work-rights (accessed 18.5.14) 
to his British counterpart, the statements made by the Swedish Prime Minister were 
relatively moderate, stressing that the rule of law must prevail. Indeed, in Sweden 
the political reaction more generally was quite liberal in tone (Hörnqvist, this 
volume). Of all the responses, however, perhaps the most outspoken and 
controversial were those by the then Interior Minister, Nicholas Sarkozy, of France. 
On the evening the two boys died, he announced that there would be no special 
investigation into the conduct of the police (Schneider, 2014), having earlier shocked 
many by saying that he would ensure areas such as Clichy were cleaned of racaille 
(‘rabble’) and voyous (‘riff-raff’); comments that many felt inflamed matters and 
helped spread the rioting beyond Paris.  
 
In both France and England the response of the penal state was quite dramatic, in 
part no doubt reflecting the scale of the rioting there. According to France’s Interior 
Ministry, 3,100 people were arrested and placed in police custody during the 2005 
riots. Of these, around half were tried straight away, of whom 560 were punished 
with an immediate custodial or partly custodial sentence (Jobard, 2008; Roché, 
2010). In England, courts were forced to hold emergency sessions overnight and at 
weekends in order to deal with the unprecedented numbers of people being 
arrested. Within two months, the ten forces most heavily affected by the rioting had 
made approximately 4,000 arrests. In the first year after the riots, of the more than 
2,000 people sentenced by the courts, two thirds received an immediate custodial 
sentence – the normal sentencing guidelines having been suspended – with 
sentence being on average almost five times the usual length (Ministry of Justice 
2012; Lightowlers and Quirk, 2015).  
 
In Sweden, it is not simply that the penal response to the riots was less extensive 
than those seen in either France or England – as implied earlier, that would hardly be 
surprising given the more limited nature of the rioting in Sweden – but it was 
generally more restrained. According to Schierup et al (2014) about 90% of the 
reported incidents arising from the disorder and reported to the Swedish police were 
dropped. Relatively few were pursued through the courts and of those that were, 
the sentences imposed appear to have been relatively mild. Similarly, and again 
somewhat in contrast with aspects of the aftermath in France and England, in 
Sweden the political reaction, the ‘populist Sweden Democrats’ apart, did not 
involve a call for more or tougher policing or for the imposition of tough penal 
policies (Schierup et al, 2014: 16). 
 
 
Conclusion 
It has not been possible in a short article to do more than sketch out some of the 
similarities and differences between the riots in France, England and Sweden in 
recent times – and I have attempted to summarise these in Table 2. My argument 
has been that, adapting and elaborating on some existing models of riot causation 
and development, it is possible to construct a broad analytical approach to the 
historical and comparative study of riots. More particularly, I have argued and have 
sought to illustrate the importance of moving beyond analyses of the aetiology of 
riots, and even beyond analyses of the nature and unfolding of riots themselves, and 
to think more in terms of the full ‘life-cycle’ of riots including, in particular, a full 
consideration of the aftermath of such events.  
 
In each of the three cases considered here it appears that the broad contextual 
factors underpinning the disorder – what we might think of as their general political 
economy – were in some respects quite similar. That is to say, the riots generally 
occurred in highly disadvantaged communities, where a significant proportion of the 
residents of those neighbourhoods might legitimately be considered to be poor or 
socially excluded and who felt themselves in many respects to be cut off from the 
mainstream of their respective societies. It is important, however, not to overlook 
the divergences that also appear to exist at this contextual level. Thus, for example, 
where both the Parisian banlieues and the Stockholm suburbs where rioting 
occurred have been described as in many ways isolated from much of the rest of 
their respective cities, it is hard to make such a claim in relation to the bulk of 
communities where the English riots occurred. Although it cannot be said that extant 
studies of riots have ignored the spatiality of riots, it might reasonably be argued 
that there remains much to be done so far as research on this issue is concerned. 
Examining the ways in which the patterning of economic and social life, the ‘natural’ 
environments and physical processes in different urban environments (Thrift, 2009) 
relate to order and disorder remains somewhat under-researched and under-
theorised (though see Body-Gendrot, 2000), not least in helping explain the absence 
of riots (Newburn, 2015b). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In terms of their dynamics, there are a number of broad similarities, most obviously 
that the rioting in all three countries, as is so often the case, was preceded by police 
actions that angered the local communities and led to protests. In all cases these 
protests were arguably handed less well, or less sensitively, than might have been 
expected, leading more or less directly to the outbreak of violence. The spread or 
diffusion of the rioting, however, differed markedly. Whereas the number of 
locations in which there was rioting in Sweden was relatively limited, and was 
certainly less extensive than in England, the riots in France in 2005 were unparalleled 
in their extent. Again, arguably, the study of the spread of rioting (and other 
behaviours – Warren and Power, 2015) is something deserving of greater attention 
(see Drury and Reicher, 2009). The new social media have begun to receive greater 
attention as a result of their appearance in relation to recent disorder, but in the 
three cases briefly considered here, there appear to have been differences in usage – 
which media as well as whether or not such technologies were utilised – between all 
three jurisdictions.  
 
What then of the nature of the rioting in France, England and Sweden? Much of the 
violence was directed at the police and, again in all three cases, anger toward the 
police was a significant motivating factor, with stop and search tactics and perceived 
racial profiling a key focus. Yet the nature of the violence varied across the 
jurisdictions. Where looting was a significant feature of the English riots – prompting 
considerable academic debate as a consequence (Newburn et al, 2015) – it was of 
much less centrality in France and virtually absent in Sweden. By contrast, in both 
France and Sweden the burning of cars was rioters preferred mode of protest – this 
being an established cultural form in both jurisdictions (Haine, 2006; Hörnqvist, 
2014).  
 
It is often extremely difficult, for understandable reasons, to create a clear picture of 
who is involved in riots, and political elites often have much to gain from claims 
made about the involvement of ‘outsiders’, of gangs, organised criminals and so on. 
In the England riots of 2011, however, such was the scale of the arrests made during 
and after the riots that it is possible to draw a number of conclusions about the 
demographic characteristics of those involved (this is not so straightforward for 
either France or Sweden). In terms of participation, there would appear to have 
been significantly greater ethnic diversity among those involved in the rioting in 
England (accepting that this, too, varied from location to location) when compared 
with either France or Sweden.  
 
This scale of response, arguably more extensive than most, if not all, riots of recent 
times in England (Newburn, 2015a), is one illustration of the importance of including 
the aftermath of riots in any analytical model. How political and penal elites react 
and respond to riots is potentially important both to understanding their dynamics - 
in both France and Sweden it appears that provocative political statements were 
important features of the growing tension during the riots – and how the riots are 
understood afterwards: in all three jurisdictions there was an unwillingness to 
consider instituting any form of major public inquiry into the events. The response of 
the penal state – the police and the courts in particular – is also crucial to our 
understanding of riots. In England in 2011, not only was the scale (the numbers 
arrested, charged, sentenced and imprisoned) different from what had been 
witnessed elsewhere, but so it appears was the temporal extent of the reaction: the 
police continued to make arrests well over a year after the riots had ended. Both 
scale and extent, together with other elements of the public, political and media 
reaction have much to add to the comparative understanding of riots.  
 
At the heart of this paper, and as a basis for the comparative study of riots – though 
it is equally applicable to historical analysis and case studies – I outlined a fourfold 
‘life-cycle’ model of riots. Within each of the four general categories – context, 
dynamics, nature and response – I identified at least three separate analytical 
divisions, each of which helps focus and direct attention in research on riots. 
Although the ‘life cycle’ approach clearly owes a great deal to other models, David 
Waddington’s ‘flashpoints’ model in particular, it also departs significantly from 
them. Most obviously the model seeks to recognise the importance of the aftermath 
of riots as being of considerable sociological and criminological significance in the 
understanding of such events. Moreover, the very notion of ‘life cycle’, points to the 
need to consider all stages of riots – their context and aetiology, trigger and onset, 
growth, spread and diffusion, ending and aftermath, together with a whole range of 
structural, institutional, political and interactional elements as they unfold – in any 
fully comprehensive analysis of such occasional, usually unpredictable, but 
enormously socially important events.  
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4
 In my view this model is appropriate both for the general study of riots (individual riots or many), 
and also the historical and comparative analysis of such disorder (historical analysis in this case being 
in essence simply another form of comparison) 
TABLE 1: The ‘life-cycle’ model for the analysis4 of riots 
Context  Structural context 
The material and social 
circumstances of the 
society, the cities and 
neighbourhoods in which 
riots occur; the nature of 
the relationships between 
different social groups and 
the state; and the ways in 
which such structural 
matters relate to the 
breakdown in order 
Political/ ideological 
context 
The nature of political 
systems – national and 
local - and their impact on 
different social groups; the 
relationships between 
different social groups, 
especially dissenting 
groups, to political and 
ideological institutions 
Cultural context 
The ways in which 
different social groups 
understand the social 
world and their place in it; 
the nature and 
organisation of national, 
local and other media; the 
cultural understandings by 
communities of 
themselves and of the 
history of conflict 
Dynamics How it starts  
What in the literature is 
generally referred to as a 
‘flashpoint’ or triggering 
event, together with linked 
developments that may act 
to stoke, or two mitigate 
tensions 
Diffusion & development 
How rioting spreads - from 
one place to others – and 
what happens to the 
nature of rioting during 
that process 
Extent & ending 
The extent of the rioting – 
both geographically and 
temporally – together with 
those factors that 
contribute to bringing the 
disorder to a close 
Nature Participation & motivation 
Which individuals, groups, 
communities are involved 
in the rioting and what is 
their alleged/perceived 
motivation 
Policing the disorder  
How do the police & other 
agencies of control 
respond to the disorder 
and how, if at all, does 
their role/tactics change as 
the rioting unfolds  
What is involved 
What different forms of 
violence are present – 
physical violence, arson, 
damage, looting – and 
which, if any, predominate 
Response  Political/public opinion and 
media response 
How political leaders, 
other opinion formers and 
the public understand and 
react to the riots, including 
the forms of language and 
rhetoric used. Also, how 
the riot(s) are reported and 
constructed in the (mass) 
media 
Penal response 
How the state, through the 
police, the courts and 
other institutions, deals 
with the rioting both 
during the disorder and in 
the aftermath 
Public policy response 
The ways in which the 
state – both nationally and 
locally – reacts to the riots 
in broader public policy 
terms: in the short-term 
including whether an 
official inquiry was 
instituted, and in the 
longer-term how the state 
reacts economically, 
industrially, culturally and 
socially to the groups 
involved, and to the 
problems identified.  
 
 
 
 
   TABLE 2: The ‘life-cycle’ model applied to France, England & Sweden 
 Context  Structural context 
Deprivation & social 
marginalisation 
Political/ ideological 
context 
Broadly similar despite 
involvement of different 
groups 
Cultural context 
 
Dynamics How it starts  
Misuse of police power 
Mishandling of protests 
Racial profiling 
Diffusion & development 
 
Extent & ending 
4/5 days in both 
England and Sweden 
Nature Participation  
Primarily 2
nd
 generation 
‘immigrants’ 
(France/Sweden) 
 
Motivation 
Revenge against police 
Policing the disorder  
Mishandling of protest; 
Misinformation; 
Failure to manage 
‘rumour’ 
What is involved 
Attacks on police 
Response  Political/public opinion 
and media response 
Provocative statements 
from Interior Minister 
(France) & Prime 
Minister (Sweden) 
Penal response 
 
Public policy response 
Unwillingness to 
institute major public 
inquiry 
     
 Context  Structural context 
 
Political/ ideological 
context 
 
Cultural context 
‘Spatial segregation’ 
greater in France & 
Sweden  
Dynamics How it starts  
 
Diffusion & development 
Spread much greater in 
France; very little 
diffusion in Sweden 
Extent & ending 
Three weeks in France 
(but no more than 4/5 
days in any location) 
Nature Participation  
Ethnically diverse in 
England 
 
Motivation 
 
Policing the disorder  
What some felt was slow 
policing response to the 
disorder (France & 
England) 
 
What is involved 
Significantly more 
looting in England 
Burning of cars in 
France and Sweden 
Response  Political/public opinion 
and media response 
 
Penal response 
More extensive (numbers 
& time) and punitive in 
England & France 
Public policy response 
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